Trusted Infrastructure
Fleet policy enforced at ingest
SecureGrid keeps metrology and inference in one trust domain. Every result exports an attestation bundle; policy is enforced where data is admitted.
Design targets · not measured silicon results
- Trust boundary
- Supporting logic
- Signed data in flight
Per-device trust decisions drift over a decade
Firmware and models diverge across a long-lived fleet. If acceptability is decided on-device or only at commissioning, the operator’s picture silently diverges from reality.
- Measured epoch
- Flagged for re-measure
- Light = the digest being extended
One trust domain, one policy at the boundary
Measurement and inference share TrustCore. Bundles are verified at ingest against centrally stated approved configurations; offline queues keep gaps visible.
What follows from the diagram
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Single trust domain
Metrology and inference share one identity and boot record
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Verify at ingest
Every result passes one admission checkpoint
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Policy once
Approved measurements and models defined centrally per role
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Long-horizon audit
Archived bundles answer configuration years later
Reviewing this mechanism?
The specification can still change. That stops being true after tape-out.