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Execution

Trusted Infrastructure

Fleet policy enforced at ingest

SecureGrid keeps metrology and inference in one trust domain. Every result exports an attestation bundle; policy is enforced where data is admitted.

Architecture defined Pre-silicon
Status
Architecture defined
Integrity chains
Metrology and inference, one domain
Anchor
TrustCore per-die identity
Admission
Bundle verified before workflow entry
Deployments
None; pre-silicon

Design targets · not measured silicon results

Trust domain Trusted compute
Nelix trusted compute domain Floorplan with four nested planes: board domain, package, die, and a central trust island for device identity, measurement and signing. Compute, memory, sensor I/O, metrology, crypto and telemetry route into a ring bus. Only signed data leaves through an attestation export port. Board domain Package Die Die extent Package extent Compute Bounded array Memory Measured store I/O phy Sensor ingress Metrology Sense & sample Crypto Sign & seal Telemetry Signed export Ring bus Trust island Root of trust Key slots Identity · measure · sign Port signed Attestation export Nothing else crosses
  • Trust boundary
  • Supporting logic
  • Signed data in flight
Trusted Infrastructure · labelled architecture
Infrastructure equipment in the field conditions this mechanism is designed for
Field condition the mechanism is specified against
PROBLEM

Per-device trust decisions drift over a decade

Firmware and models diverge across a long-lived fleet. If acceptability is decided on-device or only at commissioning, the operator’s picture silently diverges from reality.

While running Runtime verification
Continuous runtime verification A conceptual die floorplan for continuous measurement. An always-on measurement engine occupies the left of the die, with a four-phase cycle beneath it: sample, hash, extend, compare. To its right a recessive band shows workload activity in three lanes of uneven task footprints. A sample bus runs under the band and a comb of taps drops from it into a digest chain of linked cells, one per epoch, which the light extends from left to right. One epoch is flagged and re-measured. Beneath the chain the measured history stacks downward in rows that fade as they age, and the chain has no entry from its left end, so the record can only be extended and never rewound. Fresh evidence leaves through a port on the right edge. Operating die · power on Measure engine Always on Sampler Hash macro Every epoch not only at boot Sample Hash Extend Compare Workload activity L0 L1 L2 Sample bus Rolling digest E0 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 No rewind Re-measure Measured history E6 E5 E4 E3 Fresh quote Measurement continues for as long as the device runs
  • Measured epoch
  • Flagged for re-measure
  • Light = the digest being extended
Boot-time proof goes stale, so measurement continues while the device works and the evidence an operator asks for is always current.
One trust domain, one policy at the boundary · design intent
APPROACH

One trust domain, one policy at the boundary

Measurement and inference share TrustCore. Bundles are verified at ingest against centrally stated approved configurations; offline queues keep gaps visible.

Memory-block silicon
Memory-block silicon
PROPERTIES

What follows from the diagram

  1. Single trust domain

    Metrology and inference share one identity and boot record

  2. Verify at ingest

    Every result passes one admission checkpoint

  3. Policy once

    Approved measurements and models defined centrally per role

  4. Long-horizon audit

    Archived bundles answer configuration years later