Secure Boot
A measured chain, not one gate at power-on
Each stage is measured into TrustCore before it runs. The result is a reportable configuration, and authentic but superseded images are refused.
Design targets · not measured silicon results
- Trust boundary
- Supporting logic
- Signed data in flight
A signature check at reset says nothing about now
Verified boot answers one question at one instant. It leaves no lasting record of what loaded, and a signed but withdrawn image can reopen a fixed hole if anti-rollback is absent.
- Measured epoch
- Flagged for re-measure
- Light = the digest being extended
Measure, then hand over
Each stage is hashed and extended into an append-only register before control transfers. A monotonic counter blocks rollback; a signed recovery image stays on the same measured path.
Sequence
Order is the mechanism, and nothing here is optional.
- Ordered step
- Only exit
What follows from the diagram
-
Stage-by-stage measurement
The record covers the whole chain, not only the first image
-
Append-only register
Later code cannot rewrite earlier measurements
-
Anti-rollback counter
Authentic superseded images fail a monotonic check
-
Measured recovery
Fallback boots are distinguishable from normal boots
Reviewing this mechanism?
The specification can still change. That stops being true after tape-out.